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France has long been considered as the ideal type of statist interest intermediation, despite 
some elements of weak neo-corporatism. With a strong central government and a highly 
technocratic tradition, interest groups had but a marginal role to play in the policy-making 
process. Mistrustful of intermediary bodies that were considered to distort the expression of 
the public interest, France tellingly outlawed associations at the end of the 18th century and 
only re-established associational freedom in 1901. In tradition with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
beliefs in the nuisance of private groups to public life and with the negative experience of war 
corporatism under the Vichy Regime, the Fifth Republic was built around a strong executive 
removed from parliamentary pressures and with little interest in the consultation of non-
governmental stakeholders. Many authors have labelled this particular type of state-society 
relations “statism”.  
Yet state-led and centralized policy-making came under pressure in the 1970s and 
1980s. Dirigist economic policy-making broke down after François Mitterrand’s failed 
Keynesian experiment in 1983. The concurrent drive towards decentralization that the new 
left government had undertaken in 1982-4 underlined the necessity to include local actors in 
the governance networks at the regional level. The late 1980s and 1990s were a period 
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marked by attempts by the French government to empower a divers set of social groups as 
political actors in their own right. The simultaneous explosion of interest intermediation at the 
European level that followed the Single European Act in 1986 and the Single Market project 
in 1992 provided a further venue for interest groups eager to circumvent the tutelage of the 
French state. In particular regional and economic actors have been able to benefit 
tremendously from these new opportunities and to exert pressure on their home government 
by passing through the European Union (Ladrech 1994; Schmidt 1996b; Grossman and 
Saurugger 2004; Weisbein 2005). In line with developments elsewhere, “civil society” has 
become the mot d’ordre for politicians and bureaucratic decision-makers in France (see 
Smismans 2006). Grossman and Saurugger (2006) speak of the “participatory turn” to 
highlight how central the concept of “participatory democracy” has become in the discourse 
and initiatives of public decision-makers.  
Over one hundred years after the law of 1901 and at the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Fifth Republic, we are at a good moment to evaluate these changes. What are the 
consequences of the re-shuffling of the state-society relations? Has the French government 
abandoned its statist relations with social actors and established more open and participatory 
policy regimes? Is statism still a pertinent category to speak of interest intermediation in 
France? In particular, one may ask if civil society groups have been able to rise up to the 
challenge and seize the new opportunities offered. While Vivien Schmidt (1996a) has 
demonstrated how economic actors and in particular entrepreneurs contributed to redefining 
the political economy of France, others remain more pessimistic. Jonah Levy’s (1999) study 
of regional economic policy-making shows that governmental actors tried to implement what 
he calls “associational liberalism” but largely failed. Indeed, compared to their European 
counterparts, even economic actors, such as the national employer association, the 
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Mouvements des enterprises de France (Medef), remain relatively weak policy-actors, despite 
intense public relations campaigns in recent years (Culpepper 2003; Woll 2006). 
But this is precisely the paradox of the recent transformation of interest intermediation 
in France. While traditional groups such as trade unions and employers’ organizations 
struggle to adapt to the new modes of representation and partially fail to do to, a multitude of 
new associations flourish and actively take part in policy deliberation and local administration 
(Saurugger and Grossman 2006). 1 million groups are estimated to be active in France today, 
twice as much as in the mid-1980s (Decool 2005). Opposition to established parties and new 
social values such as environmentalism, feminism, or personal liberties are fought for and 
defended by associations, which play a crucial role in organizing protests and shaping the 
atmosphere of electoral campaigns. In 2004, the French government assigned the first ever 
ministerial title for associational life to Jean-François Lamour and organized a National 
Conference for Associational Life in 2006 to decide on ways and means to support the 
participation of groups in policy-making. On a great number of issues and especially in 
regional governance, associational networks have become essential, but only if and when the 
government has invited them to take part in the policy process. 
In the following, I argue that interest intermediation in France has transformed 
profoundly, but statism still remains a pertinent category to understand the range of these 
changes. Interest group consultation only supplements bureaucratic decision-making and the 
central government has considerable room for manoeuvre to escape pressures put on specific 
policy proposals. However, civil society groups do take part in the implementation of policy 
projects and contribute to the atmosphere in which the objectives become defined. Indeed, 
associations increasingly take over functions that were previously the domain of political 
parties (Manin 2007). They are the pillars of policy communities and create allegiances that 
allow for issue-specific identity politics. As such, the semi-institutionalized forms of 
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associational participation are part of the particular equilibrium that is slowly establishing in 
response to the representational crisis that has affected the Fifth Republic (Grossman and 
Saurugger 2006; Berger 2006) .  
The chapter divides in two parts. A first section opposes the elements that earned 
France a reputation for being statist with the growth and vivacity of associational life. A 
second section then asks if these changes are only superficial. Despite the difficulties of the 
traditional social partners to drive socio-economic reform in France, I argue that groups have 
become an important part of the French system of representation, especially as forums for 
deliberation and the implementation of policy projects and institutionalized feedback 
mechanisms for governmental initiatives.  
1. The rise of associations in statist France  
 French statism 
Political thinkers from James Madison (2004 [1787]) to Alexis de Tocqueville (1966 
[1835/1840]) recognized that associations promised the liberty of expression for individual 
citizens but also posed a threat to political stability, as they could turn into hotbeds or “violent 
factions”. Yet, for Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2006 [1762]), associations were undesirable even 
if they did not turn to violence. As “societies within society”, they affected the interests of 
their members and therefore prohibited the free expression of the general will. The state could 
not represent the public interest of all citizens, if several organized in groups and influenced 
public decisions. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, this philosophy was put into law 
through the Décret d’Allarde of 2 March 1791, which abolished corporations, the Le 
Chapelier law of 14 June 1791, which outlawed professional associations, and a decree on 18 
August 1792 against religious groups. These restrictions were continuously debated in the 
later half of the 19th century, but it was not until 1884 that professional groups were allowed 
and until 1 July 1901 that associational freedom was fully re-established (Barthélemy 2000: 
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38-57; Belorgey 2000: 15-26). However, the authorisation of associations was not simply a 
liberal act meant to empower civic groups, but also a ways of controlling those that have been 
properly registered and setting them apart from others, in particular religious groups 
(Belorgey 2000: 19).1  
After a period of war-time corporatism under the Vichy regime, the Fifth Republic 
maintained associational freedom, but preserved a great degree of mistrust towards all forms 
of organized groups. Yet over time French law became increasingly supportive of 
associations. In 1971, the associational freedom granted in 1901 became a constitutional 
clause. Additional legislation followed, either to facilitate voluntary work or to help specific 
groups, such as associations of the elderly in 1977 or athletic school clubs in 1986. 
Associations of foreigners, the last remaining ones to be restricted under the Fifth Republic, 
became legal in 1981.  
 However, the deep-seated defiance against intermediary bodies in political life is not 
only manifest in legal arrangements concerning these groups directly; it also plays out in the 
organization of government. Frank Wilson (1987) argues that at several institutional 
arrangements contribute to the exclusion of intermediary groups in policy-making in the Fifth 
Republic. First, the strong role for the political executive allows the French president to 
control the legislative calendar together with the prime minister. Moreover, through the use of 
package votes (which do not allow for amendments) and votes of confidence (which require a 
motion of censure to block a government bill), the government can limit parliamentary control 
over its proposals and thus restrict the influence of lobbyists who seek to affect the wording of 
a bill.  
Second, party cohesion in the legislative tends to insulate individual representatives 
from constituency pressure. Representatives often vote the party line, even if regional 
differences should lead them to disagree on policy content. Frank Wilson also highlights the 
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importance of ideological cleavages, which make it difficult to argue over the technical 
details. However, these voting patterns noted in the late 1980s may not persist over time or 
apply to issues with both high and low political salience. The attempt of the French legislative 
to propose a bill to regulate lobbying in the National Assembly indicates that interest group 
pressure on the legislature has increased considerably in recent years.2  
A third element of French statism is the strength of state bureaucracy and technocratic 
policy-making. Traditionally, the generalist training of French bureaucrats in the grandes 
écoles made them somewhat hostile to external consultation procedures and counter-expertise 
provided by interest groups. The main policy orientation in the government bureaucracies 
springs from the educational backgrounds of individual administrators, their corps, and not 
their contacts with outside stakeholders. And yet, stable consultation procedures and 
institutions jointly managed by the government and the social partners exist within the French 
bureaucracy, especially in social policy areas or agriculture, which has led some authors to 
speak of corporatism “à la française” (Jobert and Muller 1987).  
Finally, the centralization of the French political system is a fourth element weakening 
the role of political groups. As everywhere else, regional and departmental governments are 
generally more accessible for local stakeholder groups, but they have traditionally lacked 
power relative to the national government. The moves towards decentralization since the 
1970s have therefore contributed to empowering local groups and led to a “more pluralist, 
competitive and negotiated polity” (Le Galès 2006). 
 This review of the traditional model of state-society relations in France highlights that 
many of the central elements of statism have evolved over time. Despite the deep-seated 
mistrust of the potential nuisance of groups, French law and the political institutions in France 
moved towards acceptance and incorporation of intermediary bodies into policy-making 
processes.  
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 The associational explosion 
Decision-makers increasingly acknowledged the social benefits of associational life 
and started encouraging and promoting them. Whether they are politically active as interest 
groups or not, associations have become a visible feature of French society in the second half 
of the Fifth Republic. To begin with, the steep rise in the number of associations in France is 
striking. One million are estimated to exist in France today, which is twice as much as in the 
mid-eighties. Figures are most precise for the creation of associations, which are recorded to 
average around 60 000 annually in recent years, up from around 25 000 creations per year in 
the mid-1970s (see figure 1).3 21,6 million French aged 15 or older – over 45% of the 
population of France – held at least one associational membership in 2002. Due to multiple 
memberships, associations throughout France were able to count 35,6 million members 
(Febvre and Muller 2004).  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 A break-down by sector of activity of associations created each year indicates that a 
large part of these associations are not primarily political groups but cover issues such as 
education and training (e.g. parent-teacher associations or specialized education), local social 
activities (e.g. family, health or old age), housing (e.g. neighbourhood associations), athletic 
activities or leisure activities (see figure 2).  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
One may suspect that creations per year do not give a complete picture of the associational 
landscape, because these figures cannot indicate differences in longevity according to sector. 
Professional groups, for example, might have a longer life span than neighbourhood 
associations or sport and music clubs. But even when one looks at the membership 
percentages in French society, associations promoting leisure activities remain at the top. As 
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table 1 indicates, only 5% of all French aged 15 or older are members of a trade union or a 
professional association, while 19% belong to a sports club.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Grouping associations according to the motivation of the participants, the National 
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) distinguishes between groups formed in 
the pursuit of specific activities (sport and culture), social interaction between like-minded 
groups (elderly, church, local, alumni, veterans and retired people) and the defence of 
interests (unions and professional associations, humanitarian, parents-teacher or housing). In 
2002, sport and cultural associations accounted for 37% of all membership, principally from 
the young parts of the population, associations aiming for social interaction accounted for  
27% of memberships and interest representation amounted to 36% of all membership (Febvre 
and Muller 2003). To be sure, these distinctions are somewhat artificial, as the defence of 
interests presupposes the existence of a group of like-minded people. Most prominently, 
Mancur Olson (1965) has pointed out, that lobbying is often a side-effect of groups 
constituted for an entirely different purpose. With its 38 million members, the American 
Association of Retired People (AARP), for example, has often been called one of 
Washington’s most powerful lobbying groups (Morris 1996). One should therefore be careful 
not to dismiss the associational explosion as a phenomenon that might improve only the 
French social tissue but which has little political consequences. Since political activity is quite 
hard to separate from other associational activities, we will deal with associational life as 
explicitly or implicitly political, even if a majority of groups engage primarily in leisure 
activities (Lelieveledt and Cainani 2007).  
 The political aspects of associational life become evident when one considers the new 
political discourse on democratic policy-making. Politicians today appeal explicitly to 
associations as the legitimate setting of deliberation, arguing that they give a voice to different 
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sectors of French society. The centennial anniversary of the law of 1901 was an occasion to 
publicly praise the benefits of associational freedom.4 In 2004, the Ministry for Youth and 
Athletics became the Ministry for Youth, Athletics and Associational Life, giving France for 
the first time in history a minister charged with the development of associations, Jean-
François Lamour.5 In a speech to the Economic and Social Council, Lamour interprets this 
decision as a desire by the President and the Prime Minister to acknowledge publicly that 
intermediary groups have become “essential to the exercise of democracy and the 
development of social ties.” His mission is thus to “make participatory democracy 
meaningful, by going beyond strictly administrative debates in order to create a true civil 
dialogue in the public interest.”6 These declarations epitomize a turn-around in French 
attitudes towards associations that began over two decades ago. Already in 1983, the National 
Council for Associative Life (Conseil national de la vie associative – CNVA) was created as 
a consultative body under the auspices of the Prime Minister to survey and facilitate the work 
of associations in France. In a speech at the CNVA in 2004, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre 
Raffarin had expressed his belief that decentralization needed to be accompanied by the social 
cohesion that association can provide. According to him, “the legitimacy of civil society” is 
crucial for a “representative and participatory democracy.” This implies “not only to consult, 
but also to share the public interest.” In opposition to traditional French thought, he stresses 
that “the state does not have the monopoly of the public interest.”7 This is a remarkable break 
with the past, where French politicians insisted that groups are a threat to democracy and the 
expression of public interest. 
Indeed, public administration under the Fifth Republic has put an increasing emphasis 
on group consultation. Consultation happens not only in the Economic and Social Council, 
which Appleton (2005: 57) calls the “lynchpin of the Gaullist vision of a political process of 
concertation,” but also in an impressive number of councils, commissions and committees 
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open to participation from representatives of different stake-holder groups.  In 1971, the 
number of consultative organs was estimated at 500 councils, 1200 commissions and 3000 
committees, whereas a recent government estimate that Appleton cites put the total number at 
20 000, including 645 national councils. In line with this new vision, French politicians set 
out to clarify and institutionalize the role of associational participation in politics. In January 
2003, the French government organized the first ever National Conference of Associational 
Life, which aimed at recognizing the role of associations in the civil dialogue, 
institutionalizing relations with public actors and facilitating voluntary service within 
associations.8 
The associational explosion and the new discourse on participatory democracy 
indicate that France has indeed undergone a “participatory turn”, much comparable to other 
European democracies (see Maloney and Roßteutscher 2007). However, this does not mean 
that France has adopted a pluralist model of state-society relations. In fact, not all groups have 
been able to benefit from the new political opportunities. As Saurugger and Grossman 
highlight, the “participatory turn” in France comes with a paradox: while many new 
associations find an open political opportunity structure, traditional groups such as employer 
organizations or trade unions have not be able to expand their role in policy-making 
(Saurugger and Grossman 2006). 
 
2. Tocqueville’s revenge? 
For Jonah Levy, the passiveness of the social partners in shaping regional policy 
responses was due to the burden of history: after decades of excluding intermediary groups 
for policy-making, decision-makers were unable to mobilize their relevant partners in the last 
part of the 20th century. He called this phenomenon “Tocqueville’s revenge”. Although 
Tocqueville advocated the benefits of groups, it was the Rousseauian rejection of groups that 
 11
was implemented in French history. According to Levy, this now comes to haunt French 
politicians who would like to rely on strong social intermediaries to coordinate and implement 
policies.  
The analysis proposed in this chapter is more nuanced. Associations have spread and 
play an important role in French politics, but not all of them and not everywhere. Levy is 
therefore right to insist on the legacies of statism, which help in particular to understand the 
weak role of the social partners that are so central to the neo-corporatist arrangements of other 
European countries. The rise of associational liberalism in France nonetheless transformed 
policy-making and opened up new political opportunity structures for previously marginalized 
groups of French society.  
 
 Weak social partners 
Assessing the role of employer associations and trade unions in France has always 
been difficult in international comparisons, particularly those that sought to rank countries on 
a scale from pluralism, where many groups compete for influence, to neo-corporatism, where 
the social partners enjoyed privileged ties to the government and played a central role in the 
coordination of socio-economic institutions. Depending on the measures used, France 
appeared as moderately to weakly corporatist and sometimes fell off the scale altogether 
(Siaroff 1999). The contradictory picture led many authors to put France in a category of its 
own: even though the social partners are able to determine wage levels and other aspects of 
labour issues since the 1950 law on collective bargaining, the French state maintains a strong 
role in the coordination of socio-economic issues. What characterized industrial relations in 
the first half of the Fifth Republic was, first, the predominance of protest politics: labour 
relations were represented and experienced a class conflict in mass actions organized by trade 
unions. Second, the high institutionalization of the social partners in consultative committees 
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and joint management councils (paritarisme) that govern important aspects of social policy 
such as unemployment, retirement or social security. Despite the lack of consensual policy-
making at the national level, individual policy sectors therefore display a very high degree of 
corporatist management. A third feature of the French model is the firm-level management of 
job stability and career advancement (see Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996; Lallement 2006). 
With heavy government intervention in socio-economic areas, associations of employers and 
workers concentrated on labor law and protest movements rather than collective negotiation 
capacity.  
Starting in the 1980s, this post-war order was challenged by political and market 
pressures for greater flexibility. French firms lobbied individually for new policy solutions at 
the European and the national level and partially circumvented both the bureaucratic state and 
the encompassing employer organizations (Schmidt 1996b). French trade unions, which had 
always been ideologically divided into several competing organizations, were unable to 
respond to these changes collectively. Trade union density, traditionally one of the lowest in 
European comparison, fell from 20% in the early 1970s to 8% in the present (see Ebbinghaus 
and Visser 2000).  What is already a low figure hides important disparities: over half of the 
unions are in the public sector, which has a unionization level of about 15%, while only 5% of 
workers in the private sector (which accounts for 70% of employment) are unionized. In other 
words, trade unions have almost no influence over important parts of the French economy, but 
remain strong in distinct “fortresses” of unionization, such as the transport sector (Andolfatto 
and Labbé 2006b: 290). The privatization of public companies during the 1980s was therefore 
a further blow that contributed to the fall of trade union influence (Culpepper 2006). Figure 3 
shows that strikes in the private sector have fallen sharply since the 1970s. Although strikes 
remain a feature of French politics, they now affect mainly the public sector.9 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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The reform of working time in the 1990s revealed the weakness of the organized 
social partners. Both the Robien Law of 1996 and the Aubry Laws of 1998 and 2000 
encouraged firm-level negotiation over working time. Moreover, the government imposed 35-
hour week implemented by the Aubry Laws was experienced as a political embarrassment to 
employers (Woll 2006). Trade unions, in turn, found it difficult to organize effectively at the 
firm level: most of their past efforts had gone into the institutionalized bi-partite institutions 
and large-scale protest. A set of legal exemptions introduced in the 1980s and capped by the 
2004 law on social dialogue steadily replaced sectoral negotiations with firm level 
negotiations, which experienced an important increase in the late 1990s (Jobert and Saglio 
2004), as figure 4 shows. Although the number of national and branch agreements has 
remained stable over the last thirty years, this development profoundly undermines the 
importance of collective bargaining in French labour relations. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
A financing scandal of over 19 million € withdrawn in cash by Denis Gautier-
Sauvagnac, president of the Union des Industries et Métiers de la Métallurgie (UIMM), to 
“smooth social relations” sheds further doubts about the capacity of the traditional social 
partners to renew themselves and reinvent their role in the social dialogue.10 The battle that 
has broken out between the peak organization Medef (Mouvement des enterprises de France, 
formerly the Conseil national du patronat français) and UIMM over the consequences of this 
scandal illustrates how central the reform of industrial relations is to the cohesion of the 
French business associations. Unity among trade unions is no less difficult. Since the 1980s, 
new unions and associations were created to challenge the old pillars of French industrial 
relations system. The state-recognized representative unions Confédération générale du 
travail, Confédération française démocratique du travail, Force ouvrière, Confédération 
française des travailleurs chrétiens and Confédération générale des cadres now compete with 
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others that have split away, such as the Union nationale des syndicats autonomes, the 
Fédération syndicale unitaire and a group of 10 trade unions under the label G-10 SUD.11 
The diversification on the employer side is comparable, even though the Medef can claim to 
represent about 60% of French firms (see Woll 2006).  
However, while internal fragmentation and de-unionization has undermined the 
collective bargaining capacities of the social partners, it has not kept them from contributing 
to public debates and challenging government initiative. The most noted initiative of Medef, 
the “social refoundation” launched in 1999 and the successful large-scale protests 
orchestrated by trade unions against a new employment contract (the contrat première 
embauche) in the fall of 2006 even led Mark Vail (2007) to speak of “competitive 
interventionism” in France, where the state competes with the social partners for control over 
the direction of socio-economic reform. Whether the social partners compete indeed on equal 
footing with the state is doubtful, but it is true that the French government focuses on 
structured dialogue with societal stakeholders in recent years and delegates parts of its 
programs to societal groups for implementation. It is now more and more likely that 
governmental projects will be submitted for discussion with the social partners to assure some 
sort of consensus, but many observers highlight that “discussion” does not imply 
“negotiation” (e.g. Andolfatto and Labbé 2006b: 285). By controlling policy initiatives and 
shifting its actions from direct intervention to enabling policies, the government remains 
central in shaping socio-economic institutions in France. The social partners have largely 
failed to become institutionalized pillars of some form of neo-corporatist governance at the 
national level. However, as forums for dialogue and deliberations, the traditional trade unions 
and employer associations, just like their new competitors, have become part of the policy 
networks that influence the evolution of individual issues. To see how this is possible, we 
have to turn to the new role of associations in French politics more generally. 
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 The functions of associational representation 
In his survey of the evolution of industrial relations in France, Michel Lallement 
(2006: 50) highlights that recent changes are based on a trend towards the “contractualization 
of society”. By this he means that the French government no longer prescribes policy 
solutions, but oversees the negotiations between stakeholders over the rules, practices and 
relationships that define social life. With the aim of a consensual outcome, these procedures 
encourage stakeholders to be constructive and autonomous, but nonetheless bind them by 
contractual solidarity. This trend towards consensus-oriented negotiations applies not just to 
industrial relations, but to state-society relations in France in general. To avoid extensive 
protest and ensure effective governance, the French government increasingly privileges 
stakeholder groups as partners in the elaboration and implementation of policy initiatives. In 
this framework, associations play an important role as forums for deliberation, as identity 
communities and as implementation networks. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
 Numerous scholars have pointed out the rising importance of deliberation as an 
element of democratic decision-making.12 By emphasizing inclusion, compromise and 
transparency, deliberative decision-making implies greater openness to groups that can define 
themselves as stakeholders. In doing so, the consultation with associations increases the 
legitimacy of the policy process and appears to provide a partial remedy to the ‘crisis of 
representation’ noted by many observers of the French political system (e.g. Berger 2006).  
However, deliberation does not mean that outcomes are necessarily consensual.  
Grossman and Saurugger (2006) distinguish between competitive and cooperative 
deliberation to clarify this point. Under competitive deliberation, associations express their 
often conflicting opinions on a policy issue in a public debate and use media or mass 
communication strategies to sway public opinion. Ultimately, citizens or their elected 
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representatives act as judges in determining the public interest. The new strategy of the 
employer association Medef epitomizes this trend. Breaking with its rather secretive and 
informal public intervention of the CNPF, Medef has concentrated on extensive media 
campaigns and outreach programs aimed to affect public opinion.13 Other social actors 
actively contest the propositions made by Medef on socio-economic issues in equally public 
campaigns. The objective of these campaigns is not to reach a compromise, but to make one’s 
opinion heard and to determine the terms of a debate, with the ultimately goal of swaying 
legislators by means of public opinion pressures (see Manin 2004).  
Cooperative deliberation describes procedures that aim to define a policy strategy 
which all actors can agree on. Grossman and Saurugger (2006: 311) note that cooperative 
deliberation was the objective of two series of legislation in France in the 1990s. Consultation 
with and information of local stakeholders became central to urban and regional policy in the 
early 1990s. In 1995, the Barnier law makes consultation obligatory and creates the National 
Commission for Public Debate (Commission nationale du débat public - CNDP). In the late 
1990s, several government bills open up policy processes to interest groups, in particular 
regional and sustainable development and urban policy. Associations become thus an 
increasingly institutionalized part of public deliberation procedures, even in areas that were 
not marked by sector-specific corporatism.  
 A second function of associations in political life in France comes with the first. Since 
associations now participate in politics on behalf of very diverse sets of groups in French 
society, they act as identity communities that allow for a heterogeneous representation of 
French citizens. Political parties no longer contribute to the mass integration of well defined 
social groups. As they have turned into parliamentary and campaign organizations that are 
largely candidate-centred, identification with political parties and party loyalty are declining 
(Manin 1997: 193-235). In this context, associations seem to provide an alternative to what 
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some criticize as outdated ideological cleavages. Participation in sector and issue-specific 
groups is seen as an instrument to “modernize politics”, to bring it closer to citizens and their 
preoccupations (Barthélemy 2000: 92). Put differently, associations allow for a representation 
of what is experienced as the new structure of French society. According to Alain Touraine 
(1991), the vertical organization of society around the capital/labor conflict is being replaced 
by a horizontal organization of society around a centre of insiders that are integrated into the 
labour market, surrounded by a periphery of excluded outsiders. Unlike the traditional social 
partners and political parties that are still marked by the vertical cleavages of society, 
associational representation promises to give a voice to those that would otherwise be left out 
of the system of representation. The associations of “withouts”, those without citizenship 
rights (les sans papiers), employment or housing, are an example of this trend. Just like 
economic exclusion, political exclusion is one of the primary reasons for political 
engagement: in many cases, associations form to politicize issues that its members consider to 
be insufficiently treated in the established political process, such as gender relations, racial 
discrimination, homosexual rights, child protection or ecological issues.  
However, while associations serving as identity communities perform an important 
function, one should be careful not to overestimate their capacity to create trust and civic 
engagement more generally (see Mayer 2003), a hypothesis often put forward by the social 
capital literature. Where political representation is experienced as a failure, associational 
participation does little to remedy political conflict, as one might argue in light of the 
recurrent outbreaks of violence in the French suburbs.  
 A final function of associations is their role as local networks to which the French 
government delegates important implementation and surveillance tasks. As Grossman and 
Saurugger (2004: 211) note, the new state-society equilibrium results in “increased auto-
regulation of a number of public policies.” Depending on the sector and the issue, it is not 
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uncommon to see private actors govern different elements of public policy without any or 
with only limited intervention from the state or the traditional social partners. In the context of 
decentralization, Le Galès (2006: 203) highlights that associations act as quasi-services for 
local government by running festive or social services, and that private-public partnership are 
common in the provision of environment, transport or housing services. This echoes 
Lallement’s insistence on the contractualization of French society: where they appear to 
represent legitimate stakeholders in a policy process, associations may be called upon to 
assure new forms of regulation for the issues that concern them.  
 
3. Conclusion 
The rise of associations clearly responds to changes in the French state-society 
relations. Many of the central elements of statist policy-making are transforming and have 
moved towards greater inclusion of non-governmental actors. While Levy (1999) rightly 
noticed the partial incapacity of the traditional social partners to rise up to these new 
opportunities, it is difficult to argue that the statist tradition has stifled associational 
participation in all aspects of French political life. On the contrary, associational life is 
striving and non-governmental groups participate actively in both the elaboration and the 
implementation of new policy initiatives. 
Announcing the advent of pluralism and a retreat of the state would nonetheless fail to 
capture the current French model of state-society relations. By organizing and monitoring the 
contractualization of society, the French state remains in control over socio-economic reforms 
and paces both the agenda-setting and the schedules of reform. This applies to associational 
participation as well as the relationship with the traditional social partners. A recent reform 
proposal of French labour contracts was given to the social partners for discussion, but 
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Nicolas Sarkozy tellingly announced that the French government will take over the policy 
initiative if the negotiating parties failed to develop an agreement by the end of 2007.14  
Furthermore, by decentralizing negotiations and multiplying the forums for 
deliberation, the French government has actually increased its autonomy from societal groups. 
If negotiations advance at different speeds in separate forums, it becomes much harder to 
organize nation-wide resistance, even on issues which apply in a similar manner to a diverse 
set of stakeholders. By orchestrating protest into competitive or cooperative deliberation and 
by including associations as stakeholders that it can partially delegate policy tasks to if it so 
chooses, the French state firmly remain in the driving seat of socio-economic governance.  
In comparison, the developments in France illustrate two more general trends that 
have been observed in a number of countries. First, governments now orient their policies to 
encourage associations in order to foster social capital. Despite the traditional mistrust in 
France towards all forms of civil groups, the French government now supports associational 
life and increasingly consults with stakeholders and interest groups. This participatory turn 
leads to an extensive and lively association tissue and presents a move towards pluralist 
policy-making. Second, neo-corporatist institutions are increasingly under pressure, even in a 
country which was always a mixed case with a special emphasis on jointly management 
sectoral governance. The paradox of the participatory turn comes from these two 
simultaneous movements. The social partners are least able to benefit from the changes in 
French state-society relations, because they have to straddle an old system that many argue 
should be reformed and new opportunities, which they will only be able to seize if they can 
reinvent themselves.  
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Endnotes 
 
1 The heated debates surrounding state-church relations explains why over 30 proposed laws 
on associational freedom had failed to pass between 1870 and 1901. Four years later, France 
formally separated state and church through the law of 9 December 1905 
2 See Assemblée Nationale, « Proposition de résolution tendant à modifier le Règlement de 
l’Assemblée nationale pour établir des règles de transparence concernant les groupes 
d’intérêt, » 13eme Législature, No. 156, 29 octobre 2007.  
3 Since no information is supplied when associations cease to operate, the total of existing 
associations in France relies on various estimation procedures. See Decool (2005: 9-12). 
4 Summaries of events organized at the National Assembly, the Senate, the Economic and 
Social Council, the Constitutional Court, the European Parliament or at regional institutions 
in 2001 can be found in Conseil national de la vie associative (2003: 11-38). 
5 This arrangement only lasted until May 2007. Following the merging of several 
responsibilities, the Ministry is now in charge of health, youth and athletics.  
6 Jean François Lamour’s speech of 8 July 2004 is reproduced in Conseil national de la vie 
associative (2007). 
7 Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s speech of 10 March 2004 is reproduced in Conseil national de la vie 
associative (2007). 
8 The measures adopted or initiated at this conference include an increased reliance on 
consultation and information, increased financial aid to associations, as well as recognitions 
and rewards for voluntary service. A complete list can be found in Conseil national de la vie 
associative (2007: 65). 
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9 Working days lost to public sector strikes have now overtaken private sector strikes, with 
much noticed peaks in 1989, 1995, 2000 and 2007. Starting in 1996, transport sector strikes 
are excluded from the private sector statistics and grouped with public sector transport 
strikes. For further discussion, see Lallement (2006: 63). 
10 « Patronat et organisations syndicales: un système à bout de souffle », Le Monde Economie, 
Dossier Spécial, 30 octobre 2007, p. i-viii.  
11 All of the new unions are not recognized as representative organizations, even though each 
of them represents more members than some of the smaller recognized ones. See Andolfatto 
and Labbé (2006a). 
12 For discussion and a French perspective, see Blondiaux and Sintomer (2002) 
13 The election of Laurence Parisot, CEO of a French public opinion research institute, as 
president of Medef in 2005 confirms the importance of this strategy. 
14 Remi Barroux, « Contrat de travail unique : la négociation ou la loi », Le Monde, 7 
septembre 2007.  
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Annex 
 
Figure 1: Associations in France, 1975-2005 
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Source: CNVA (2007) and Decool Rapport (2005) for estimation of total number of associations 
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Figure 2: Total of association creations by sector of activity, 1975-2005 
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Table 1 : Membership by association, 2005 
Associations  %
Sport 19
Culture 9
Trade unions and professional unions 5
Elderly 4
Alumni and veterans 3
Town and local 3
Leisure / party 3
Parents-teacher 3
Church 2
Health 2
Community service 2
Humanitarian 2
Education 1
Political parties 1
Consumers 1
Environment 1
Other 3
Total 43
Source : INSEE, permanent survey on life conditions, 2005.  
Note : Metropolitan France, age 15 or older. Percentages do not add up due to double membership. 
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Figure 3: Strikes in France in the private sector 
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Figure 4 : Evolution of collective agreements at the firm level 
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